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Abstract—This paper proposes a new defense called n-ML
against adversarial examples, i.e., inputs crafted by perturbing
benign inputs by small amounts to induce misclassifications by
classifiers. Inspired by n-version programming, n-ML trains an
ensemble of n classifiers, and inputs are classified by a vote of
the classifiers in the ensemble. Unlike prior such approaches,
however, the classifiers in the ensemble are trained specifically
to classify adversarial examples differently, rendering it very
difficult for an adversarial example to obtain enough votes to
be misclassified. We show that n-ML roughly retains the benign
classification accuracies of state-of-the-art models on the MNIST,
CIFAR10, and GTSRB datasets, while simultaneously defending
against adversarial examples with better resilience than the
best defenses known to date and, in most cases, with lower
classification-time overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Adversarial examples—minimally and adversarially per-
turbed variants of benign samples—have emerged as a chal-
lenge for machine-learning (ML) algorithms and systems.
Numerous attacks that produce inputs that evade correct clas-
sification by ML algorithms, and particularly deep neural net-
works (DNNs), at inference time have been proposed (e.g., [7],
[20], [74]). The attacks vary in the perturbation types that they
allow and the application domains, but they most commonly
focus on adversarial perturbations with bounded Lp-norms to
evade ML algorithms for image classification (e.g., [7], [11],
[20], [57], [74]). Some attacks minimally change physical
artifacts to mislead recognition DNNs (e.g., adding patterns
on street signs to mislead street-sign recognition) [18], [69].
Yet others imperceptibly perturb audio signals to evade speech-
recognition DNNs [58], [63].
In response, researchers have proposed methods to mitigate
the risks of adversarial examples. For example, one method,
called adversarial training, augments the training data with
correctly labeled adversarial examples (e.g., [28], [36], [47],
[67]). The resulting models are often more robust in the face
of attacks than models trained via standard methods. However,
while defenses are constantly improving, they are still far from
perfect. Relative to standard models, defenses often reduce the
accuracy on benign samples. For example, methods to detect
the presence of attacks sometimes erroneously detect benign
inputs as adversarial (e.g., [44], [45]). Moreover, defenses
often fail to mitigate a large fraction of adversarial examples
that are produced by strong attacks (e.g., [4]).
†Work done as a Ph.D. student at Carnegie Mellon University.
Inspired by n-version programming, this paper proposes a
new defense, termed n-ML, that improves upon the state of the
art in its ability to detect adversarial inputs and correctly clas-
sify benign ones. Similarly to other ensemble classifiers [46],
[73], [83], an n-ML ensemble outputs the majority vote if
more than a threshold number of DNNs agree; otherwise the
input is deemed adversarial. The key innovation in this work
is a novel method, topological manipulation, to train DNNs to
achieve high accuracy on benign samples while simultaneously
classifying adversarial examples according to specifications
that are drawn at random before training. Because every DNN
in an ensemble is trained to classify adversarial examples
differently than the other DNNs, n-ML is able to detect ad-
versarial examples because they cause disagreement between
the DNNs’ votes.
We evaluate n-ML using three datasets (MNIST [37],
CIFAR10 [35], and GTSRB [72]) and against L∞ (mainly)
and L2 attacks in black-, grey-, and white-box settings. Our
findings indicate that n-ML can effectively mitigate adversarial
examples while achieving high benign accuracy. For example,
for CIFAR10 in the black-box setting, n-ML can achieve
94.50% benign accuracy (vs. 95.38% for the best standard
DNN) while preventing all adversarial examples with L∞-
norm perturbation magnitudes of 8255 created by the best
known attack algorithms [47]. In comparison, the state-
of-the-art defense achieves 87.24% benign accuracy while
being evaded by 14.02% of the adversarial examples. n-ML
is also faster than most defenses that we compare against.
Specifically, even the slowest variant of n-ML is ×45.72 to
×199.46 faster at making inferences than other defenses for
detecting the presence of attacks.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:1
• We propose topology manipulation, a novel method to
train DNNs to classify adversarial examples according to
specifications that are selected at training time, while also
achieving high benign accuracy.
• Using topologically manipulated DNNs, we construct (n-
ML) ensembles to defend against adversarial examples.
• Our experiments using two perturbation types and three
datasets in black-, grey-, and white-box settings show that
n-ML is an effective and efficient defense. n-ML roughly
retains the benign accuracies of state-of-the-art DNNs,
1We will release our implementation of n-ML upon publication.
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while providing more resilience to attacks than the best
defenses known to date, and making inferences faster than
most.
We next present the background and related work (Sec. II).
Then, we present the technical details behind n-ML and
topology manipulation (Sec. III). Thereafter, we describe the
experiments that we conducted and their results (Sec. IV). We
close the paper with a discussion (Sec. V) and a conclusion
(Sec. VI).
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
This section summarizes related work and provides the
necessary background on evasion attacks on ML algorithms
and defenses against them.
A. Evading ML Algorithms
Inputs that are minimally perturbed to fool ML algorithms at
inference time—termed adversarial examples—have emerged
as a challenge to ML. Attacks to produce adversarial examples
typically start from benign inputs and find perturbations with
small Lp-norms (p typically ∈ {0, 2,∞}) that lead to mis-
classification when added to the benign inputs (e.g., [6], [7],
[11], [20], [51], [57], [74], [80]). Keeping the perturbations’
Lp-norms small helps ensure the attacks’ imperceptibility to
humans, albeit imperfectly [64], [68]. The process of finding
adversarial perturbations is usually formalized as an optimiza-
tion problem. For example, Carlini and Wagner [11] proposed
the following formulation to find adversarial perturbations that
target class ct:
argmin
r
Losscw(x+ r, ct) + κ · ||r||2
where x is a benign input, r is the perturbation, and κ helps
tune the L2-norm of the perturbation. Losscw is roughly defined
as:
Losstargcw (x+ r, ct) = max
c 6=ct
{Lc(x+ r)} − Lct(x+ r)
where Lc is the output for class c at the logits of the DNN—the
output of the one-before-last layer. Minimizing Losscw leads
x+ r to be (mis)classified as ct. As this formulation targets a
specific class ct, the resulting attack is commonly referred to
as a targeted attack. In the case of evasion where the aim is
to produce an adversarial example that is misclassified as any
class but the true class (commonly referred to as untargeted
attack), Losscw is defined as:
Lossuntargcw (x+ r, cx) = Lcx(x+ r)−max
c6=cx
{Lc(x+ r)}
where cx is the true class of x. We use Losscw as a loss function
to fool DNNs.
The Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack is considered
as the strongest first-order attack (i.e., an attack that uses gra-
dient decent to find adversarial examples) [47]. Starting from
any random point close to a benign input, PGD consistently
finds perturbations with constrained L∞- or L2-norms that
achieve roughly the same loss value. Given a benign input x,
a loss function, say Losscw, a target class ct, a step size α, and
an upper bound on the norm , PGD iteratively updates the
adversarial example until a maximum number of iterations is
reached such that:
xi+1 = Projectx,(xi + αsign(∇xLosscw(xi, ct)))
where Projectx,(·) projects vectors on the -ball around x
(e.g., by clipping for L∞-norm), and ∇xLosscw(·) denotes
the gradient of the loss function. PGD starts from a random
point x0 in the -ball around x, and stops after a fixed number
of iterations (20–100 iterations are typical [47], [67]). In this
work, we rely on PGD to produce adversarial examples.
Early on, researchers noticed that adversarial examples
computed against one ML model are likely to be misclassified
by other models performing the same task [20], [55], [56].
This phenomenon—transferability—serves as the basis of non-
interactive attacks in black-box settings, where attackers do
not have access to the attacked models and may not be able
to query them. The accepted explanation for the transfer-
ability phenomenon, at least between DNNs performing the
same task, is that the gradients (which are used to compute
adversarial examples) of each DNN are good approximators
of those of other DNNs [16], [26]. Several techniques can
be used to enhance the transferability of adversarial exam-
ples [17], [42], [76], [82]. The techniques include computing
adversarial perturbations against ensembles of DNNs [42],
[76] and misleading the DNNs after transforming the input
(e.g., by translation or resizing) [17], [82] as a means to avoid
computing perturbations that generalize beyond a single DNN.
We leverage these techniques to create strong attacks against
which we evaluate our proposed defense.
B. Defending ML Algorithms
Researchers proposed a variety of defenses to mitigate ML
algorithms’ vulnerability to adversarial examples. Roughly
speaking, defenses can be categorized as: adversarial training,
certified defenses, attack detection, or input transformation.
Similarly to our proposed defense, some defenses leverage
randomness or model ensembles. In what follows, we provide
an overview of the different categories.
Adversarial Training Augmenting the training data with
correctly labeled adversarial examples that are generated
throughout the training process increases models’ robustness
to attacks [20], [27], [28], [36], [47], [67], [74]. The re-
sulting training process is commonly referred to as adver-
sarial training. In particular, adversarial training with PGD
(AdvPGD ) [47], [67] is one of the most effective defenses to
date—we compare our defense against it.
Certified Defenses Some defenses attempt to certify
the robustness of trained ML models (i.e., provide provable
bounds on models’ errors for different perturbation magni-
tudes). Certain certified defenses estimate how DNNs trans-
form Lp balls around benign examples via convex shapes,
and attempt to force classification boundaries to not cross the
shapes (e.g., [34], [50], [59]). These defenses are less effective
than adversarial training with PGD [61]. Other defenses
estimate the output of the so-called smoothed classifier by
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classifying many variants of the input after adding noise at
the input or intermediate layers [14], [38], [41], [60]. The
resulting smoothed classifier, in turn, is proven to be robust
against perturbations of different L2-norms. Unfortunately,
such defenses do not provide guarantees against perturbations
of different types (e.g., ones with bounded L∞-norms), and
perform less well against them in practice [14], [38].
Attack Detection Similarly to our defense, there were past
proposals for defenses to detect the presence of attacks [2],
[19], [21], [25], [43], [44], [48], [49], [52], [78]. While
adaptive attacks have been shown to circumvent some of these
defenses [4], [10], [43], detectors often significantly increase
the magnitude of the perturbations necessary to evade DNNs
and detectors combined [10], [44]. In this work, we compare
our proposed defense with detection methods based on Local
Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID) [45] and Network Invariant
Checking (NIC ) [44], which are currently the leading methods
for detecting adversarial examples.
The LID detector uses a logistic regression classifier to
tell benign and adversarial inputs apart. The input to the
classifier is a vector of LID statistics that are estimated for
every intermediate representation computed by the DNN. This
approach is effective because the LID statistics of adversarial
examples are presumably distributed differently than those of
benign inputs [45].
The NIC detector expects certain invariants in DNNs to
hold for benign inputs. For example, it expects the provenance
of activations for benign inputs to follow a certain distribution.
To model these invariants, a linear logistic regression classifier
performing the same task as the original DNN is trained using
the representation of every intermediate layer. Then, for every
pair of neighboring layers, a one-class Support Vector Machine
(oc-SVM) is trained to model the distribution of the output
of the layers’ classifiers on benign inputs. Namely, every oc-
SVM receives concatenated vectors of probability estimates
and emits a score indicative of how similar the vectors are
to the benign distribution. The scores of all the oc-SVMs
are eventually combined to derive an estimate for whether
the input is adversarial. In this manner, if the output of two
neighboring classifiers on an image, say that of a bird, is
(bat, bird), the input is likely to be benign (as the two classes
are similar and likely have been observed for benign inputs
during training). However, if the output is (car, bird), then it
is likely that the input is adversarial.
Input Transformation Certain defenses suggest to trans-
form inputs (e.g., via quantization) to sanitize adversarial
perturbations before classification [22], [40], [48], [62], [71],
[81], [84]. The transformations often aim to hinder the process
of computing gradients for the purpose of attacks. In practice,
however, it has been shown that attackers can adapt to circum-
vent such defenses [3], [4], [24].
Randomness Defenses often leverage randomness to mit-
igate adversarial examples. As previously mentioned, some
defenses inject noise at inference time at the input or inter-
mediate layers [14], [25], [38], [41], [60]. Differently, Wang
et al. train a hierarchy of layers, each containing multiple
paths, and randomly switch between the chosen paths at infer-
ence time [79]. Other defenses randomly drop out neurons,
shuffle them, or change their weights, also while making
inferences [19], [78]. Differently from all these, our proposed
defense uses randomness at training time to control how a set
of DNNs classify adversarial examples at inference time and
uses the DNNs strategically in an ensemble to deter adversarial
examples.
Ensembles Similarly to our defense, several prior defenses
suggested using ensembles to defend against adversarial ex-
amples. Abbasi and Gagne´ proposed to measure the disagree-
ment between DNNs and specialized classifiers (i.e., ones
that classify one class versus all others) to detect adversarial
examples [2]. An adaptive attack to evade the specialized
classifiers and the DNNs simultaneously can circumvent this
defense [24]. Vijaykeerthy et al. train DNNs sequentially to
be robust against an increasing set of attacks [77]. However,
they only use the final model at inference time, while we
use an ensemble containing several models for inference.
A meta defense by Sengupta et al. strategically selects a
model from a pool of candidates at inference time to increase
benign accuracy while deterring attacks [65]. This defense
is effective against black-box attacks only. Other ensemble
defenses propose novel training or inference mechanisms, but
do not achieve competitive performance [29], [53], [73].
Recent papers [46], [83], [87] proposed defenses that,
similarly to ours, are motivated by n-version programming [5],
[12], [15]. In a nutshell, n-version programming aims to pro-
vide resilience to bugs and attacks by running n (≥2) variants
of independently developed, or diversified, programs. These
programs are expected to behave identically for normal (be-
nign) inputs, and differently for unexpected inputs that trigger
bugs or exploit vulnerabilities. When one or more programs
behaves differently than the others, an unexpected (potentially
malicious) input is detected. In the context of ML, defenses
that are inspired by n-version programming use ensembles
of models that are developed by independent parties [87],
different inference algorithms or DNN architectures [46], [83],
or models that are trained using different training sets [83].
In all cases, the models are trained via standard training
techniques. Consequently, the defenses are often vulnerable to
attacks (both in black-box and more challenging settings) as
adversarial examples transfer with high likelihood regardless
of the inference algorithm or the training data [20], [55], [56].
Moreover, prior work is limited to specific applications (e.g.,
speech recognition [87]). In contrast, we train the models
comprising the ensembles via a novel training technique (see
Sec. III), and our work is conceptually applicable to any
domain.
III. TECHNICAL APPROACH
Here we detail our methodology. We begin by presenting
the threat model. Subsequently, we present a novel technique,
termed topology manipulation, which serves as a cornerstone
for training DNNs that are used as part of the n-ML defense.
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Last, we describe how to construct an n-ML defense via an
ensemble of topologically manipulated DNNs.
A. Threat Model
Our proposed defense aims to mitigate attacks in black-,
grey-, and white-box settings. In the black-box setting, the
attacker has no access to the classifier’s parameters and is
unaware of the existence of the defense.2 To evade clas-
sification, the attacker attempts a non-interactive attack by
transferring adversarial examples from standard surrogate
models. Similarly, in the grey-box setting, the attacker cannot
access the classifier’s parameters. However, the attacker is
aware of the use of the defense and attempts to transfer
adversarial examples that are produced against a surrogate
defended model. In the white-box setting, the attacker has
complete access to the classifier’s and defense’s parameters.
Consequently, the attacker can adapt gradient-based white-box
attacks (e.g., PGD) to evade classification. We do not consider
interactive attacks that query models in a black-box setting
(e.g., [8], [9], [13], [26]). These attacks are generally weaker
than the white-box attacks that we do consider.
As is typical in the area (e.g., [34], [47], [61]), we
focus on defending against adversarial perturbations with
bounded Lp-norms. In particular, we mainly consider de-
fending against perturbations with bounded L∞-norms. Ad-
ditionally, we demonstrate defenses against perturbations with
bounded L2-norms as a proof of concept. Conceptually, there
is no reason why n-ML should not generalize to defend against
other types of attacks.
B. Topologically Manipulating DNNs
The main building block of the n-ML defense is a topo-
logically manipulated DNN—a DNN that is manipulated at
training time to achieve certain topological properties with
respect to adversarial examples. Specifically, a topologically
manipulated DNN is trained to satisfy two objectives: 1)
obtaining high classification accuracy on benign inputs; and
2) misclassifying adversarial inputs following a certain spec-
ification. The first objective is important for constructing a
well-performing DNN to solve the classification task at hand.
The second objective aims to change the adversarial directions
of the DNN such that an adversarial perturbation that would
normally lead a benign input to be misclassified as class ct by
a regularly trained DNN would likely lead to misclassification
as class cˆt ( 6= ct) by the topologically manipulated DNN.
Fig. 1 illustrates the idea of manipulating the topology of a
DNN via an abstract example, while Fig. 2 gives a concrete
example.
To train a topologically manipulated DNN, two datasets are
used. The first dataset, D, is a standard dataset. It contains
pairs (x, cx) of benign samples, x, and their true classes,
cx. The second dataset, D˜, contains adversarial examples.
Specifically, it consists of pairs (x˜, ct) of targeted adversarial
2For clarity, we distinguish the classifier from the defense. However, in
certain cases (e.g., for n-ML or adversarial training) they are inherently
inseparable.
u
v
x
u
v
x
Fig. 1: An illustration of topology manipulation. Left: In a
standard DNN, perturbing the benign sample x in the direction
of u leads to misclassification as blue (zigzag pattern), while
perturbing it in the direction of v leads to misclassification as
red (diagonal stripes). Right: In the topologically manipulated
DNN, direction u leads to misclassification as red, while
v leads to misclassification as blue. The benign samples
(including x) are correctly classified in both cases (i.e., high
benign accuracy).
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2: A concrete example of topology manipulation. The
original image of a horse (a) is adversarially perturbed to
be misclassified as a bird (b) and as a ship (c) by standard
DNNs. The perturbations, which are limited to L∞-norm of
8
255 , are shown after multiplying ×10. We train a topologically
manipulated DNN to misclassify (b) as a ship and (c) as a bird,
while classifying the original image correctly.
examples, x˜, and the target classes, ct. These adversarial
examples are produced against reference DNNs that are trained
in a standard manner (e.g., to decrease cross-entropy loss).
Samples in D are used to train the DNNs to satisfy the first
objective (i.e., achieving high benign accuracy). Samples in
D˜, on the other hand, are used to topologically manipulate
the adversarial directions of DNNs.
More specifically, to specify the topology of the trained
DNN, we use a derangement (i.e., a permutation with no
fixed points), d, that is drawn at random over the number
of classes, m. This derangement specifies that an adversarial
example x˜ in D˜ that targets class ct should be misclassified
as d[ct] ( 6= ct) by the topologically manipulated DNN. For
example, for ten classes (i.e., m = 10), the derangement
may look like d = [1, 6, 7, 0, 2, 8, 9, 3, 5, 4]. This derangement
specifies that adversarial examples targeting class 0 should be
misclassified as class d[0] = 1, ones targeting class 1 should
be misclassified as class d[1] = 6, and so on. For m classes,
the number of derangements the we can draw from is known
as the subfactorial (denoted by !m), and is defined recursively
as !m = (m−1)(!(m−1)+!(m−2)), where !2 = 1 and !1 = 0.
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The subfactorial grows almost as quickly as the factorial m!
(i.e., the number of permutations over a group of size m).
We specify the topology using derangements rather than
permutations that may have fixed points because if d contained
fixed points, there would exist a class ct such that d[ct] = ct. In
such case, the DNN would be trained to misclassify adversarial
examples that target ct into ct, which would not inhibit an
adversary targeting ct. Such behavior is undesirable.
We use the standard cross-entropy loss, Lossce,3 to train
topologically manipulated DNNs. Formally, the training pro-
cess minimizes:
1
|D|
∑
(x,cx)∈D
Lossce(x, cx)+
λ
|D˜|
∑
(x˜,ct)∈D˜
Lossce(x˜, d[ct]) (1)
While minimizing the leftmost term increases the benign ac-
curacy (as is usual in standard training processes), minimizing
the rightmost term manipulates the topology of the DNN (i.e.,
forces the DNN to misclassify x˜ as d[ct] instead of as ct). The
parameter λ is a positive real number that balances the two
objectives. We tune it via a hyperparameter search.
Although topologically manipulated DNNs aim to satisfy
multiple objectives, it is important to point out that training
them does not require significantly more time than for standard
DNNs. For training, one first needs to create the dataset D˜ that
contains the adversarial examples. This needs to be done only
once, as a preprocessing phase. Once D˜ is created, training
a topologically manipulated DNN takes the same amount of
time as training a standard DNN.
C. n-ML: An Ensemble-Based Defense
As previously mentioned, n-ML is inspired by n-version
programming. While n independent, or diversified, programs
are used in an n-version programming defense, an n-ML
defense contains an ensemble of n (≥2) topologically manip-
ulated DNNs. As explained above, all the DNNs in the n-ML
ensemble are trained to behave identically for benign inputs
(i.e., to classify them correctly), while each DNN is trained to
follow a different specification for adversarial examples. This
opens an opportunity to 1) classify benign inputs accurately;
and 2) detect adversarial examples.
In particular, to classify an input x using an n-ML ensemble,
we compute the output of all the DNNs in the ensemble on x.
Then, if the number of DNNs that agree on a class is above or
equal to a threshold τ , the input is classified to the majority
class. Otherwise, the n-ML ensemble would abstain from
classification and the input would be marked as adversarial.
Formally, denoting the individual DNNs’ classification results
by the multiset C = {Fi(x)|1 ≤ i ≤ n}, the n-ML
classification function, F, is defined as:
F(x) =
{
majority(C), if |{c ∈ C|c = majority(C)}| ≥ τ
abstain, otherwise
3In the case of one-hot encoding for the true class cx and a probability
estimate pˆcx emitted by the DNN, the cross-entropy loss is defined as
− log(pˆcx ).
Of course, increasing the threshold increases the likelihood
of detecting adversarial examples (e.g., an adversarial example
is less likely to be misclassified as the same target class ct
by all the n DNNs than by n − 1 DNNs). In other words,
increasing τ decreases attacks’ success rates. At the same time,
increasing the threshold harms the benign accuracy (e.g., the
likelihood of n DNNs to emit cx is lower than the likelihood
of n − 1 DNNs to do so). In practice, we set τ to a value
≥ dn+12 e, to avoid ambiguity when computing the majority
vote, and ≤ n, as the benign accuracy is 0 for τ > n.
Similarly to n-version programming, where the defense
becomes more effective when the constituent programs are
more independent and diverse [5], [12], [15], an n-ML defense
is more effective at detecting adversarial examples when the
DNNs are more independent. Specifically, if two DNNs i
and j (i 6= j) are trained with derangements di and dj ,
respectively, and we are not careful enough, there might exist
a class ct such that di[ct] = dj [ct]. If so, the two DNNs
are likely to classify adversarial examples targeting ct in the
same manner, thus reducing the defense’s likelihood to detect
attacks. To avoid such undesirable cases, we train the n-ML
DNNs (simultaneously or sequentially) while attempting to
avoid pairs of derangements that map classes in the same
manner to the greatest extent possible. More concretely, if
n is lower than the number of classes m, then we draw n
derangements that disagree on all indices (i.e., ∀i 6= j, ∀ct,
di[ct] 6= dj [ct]). Otherwise, we split the DNNs to groups
of m − 1 (or smaller) DNNs, and for each group we draw
derangements that disagree on all indices. For a group of n
DNNs, n < m, we can draw
∏n
i=1!(m− i+1) derangements
such that every pair of derangements disagrees on all indices.
IV. RESULTS
In this section we describe the experiments that we con-
ducted and their results. We initially present the datasets
and the standard DNN architectures that we used. Then we
describe how we trained individual topologically manipulated
DNNs to construct n-ML ensembles, and evaluate the extent
to which they met the training objectives. We close the
section with experiments to evaluate the n-ML defense in
various settings. We ran our experiments with Keras [30] and
TensorFlow [1].
A. Datasets
We used three popular datasets to evaluate n-ML and other
defenses: MNIST [37], CIFAR10 [35], and GTSRB [72].
MNIST is a dataset of 28 × 28 pixel images of digits (i.e.,
ten classes). It contains 70,000 images in total, with 60,000
images intended for training and 10,000 intended for testing.
We set aside 5,000 images from the training set for validation.
CIFAR10 is a dataset of 32× 32-pixel images of ten classes:
airplanes, automobiles, birds, cats, deer, dogs, frogs, horses,
ships, and trucks. The dataset contains 50,000 images for
training and 10,000 for testing. We set aside 5,000 images
from the training set for validation. Last, GTSRB is a dataset
containing traffic signs of 43 classes. The dataset contains
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39,209 training images and 12,630 test images. We used 1,960
images that we set aside from the training set for validation.
Images in GTSRB vary in size between 15×15 and 250×250.
Following prior work [39], we resized the images to 48× 48.
The three datasets have different properties that made them
especially suitable for evaluating n-ML. MNIST has relatively
few classes, thus limiting the set of derangements that we
could use for topology manipulation for large values of n.
At the same time, standard DNNs achieve high classification
accuracy on MNIST (∼99% accuracies are common), hence
increasing the likelihood that DNNs in the ensemble would
agree on the correct class for benign inputs. CIFAR10 also
relatively has a few classes. However, differently from MNIST,
even the best performing DNNs do not surpass ∼95% clas-
sification accuracy on CIFAR10. Consequently, the likelihood
that a large number n of DNNs in an ensemble would achieve
consensus may be low (e.g., an ensemble consisting of n = 5
DNNs with 95% accuracy each that incur independent errors
could have benign accuracy as low as 77% if we require all
DNNs to agree). In contrast, GTSRB contains a relatively high
number of classes, and standard DNNs often achieve high
classification accuracies on this dataset (98%–99% accuracies
are common). As a result, there is a large space from which we
could draw derangements for topology manipulation, and we
had expected high benign accuracies from n-ML ensembles.
B. Training Standard DNNs
Dataset # Architecture Acc.
MNIST
1 Convolutional DNN [11] 99.42%
2 Convolutional DNN [47] 99.28%
3 Convolutional DNN [11] w/o pooling [70] 99.20%
4 Convolutional DNN [31] 99.10%
5 Convolutional DNN [47] w/o pooling [70] 99.10%
6 Multi-layer perceptron [32] 98.56%
CIFAR10
1 Wide-ResNet-22-8 [85] 95.38%
2 Wide-ResNet-28-10 [85] 95.18%
3 Wide-ResNet-16-10 [85] 95.06%
4 Wide-ResNet-28-8 [85] 94.88%
5 Wide-ResNet-22-10 [85] 94.78%
6 Wide-ResNet-16-8 [85] 94.78%
GTSRB
1 Convolutional DNN [39] 99.46%
2 Same as 1, but w/o first branch [39] 99.56%
3 Same as 1, but w/o pooling [70] 99.11%
4 Same as 1, but w/o second branch [39] 99.08%
5 Convolutional DNN [75] 99.00%
6 Convolutional DNN [66] 98.07%
TABLE I: The DNN architectures that we used for the
different datasets. The DNNs’ accuracies on the test sets of the
corresponding datasets (after standard training) are reported to
the right.
The DNNs that we used were based on standard archi-
tectures. We constructed the DNNs either exactly the same
way as prior work or reputable public projects (e.g., by the
Keras team [31]) or by modifying prior DNNs via a standard
technique. In particular, we modified certain DNNs following
the work of Springenberg et al. [70], who found that it is
possible to construct simple, yet highly performing, DNNs by
removing pooling layers (e.g., max- and average-pooling) and
increasing the strides of convolutional operations.
For each dataset, we trained six DNNs of different
architectures—a sufficient number of DNNs to allow us to
evaluate n-ML and perform attacks via transferability from
surrogate ensembles [42] while factoring out the effect of
architectures (see Sec. IV-C and Sec. IV-D). The MNIST
DNNs were trained for 20 epochs using the Adadelta optimizer
with standard parameters and a batch size of 128 [31], [86].
The CIFAR10 DNNs were trained for 200 epochs with data
augmentation (e.g., image rotation and flipping) and training
hyperparameters set identically to prior work [85]. The GT-
SRB DNNs were trained with the Adam optimizer [33], with
training hyperparameters and augmentation following prior
work [39], [66], [75]. Table I reports the architectures and
performance of the DNNs. In all cases, the DNNs achieved
comparable performance to prior work.
C. Training Individual Topologically Manipulated DNNs
Now we describe how we trained individual topologically
manipulated DNNs and report on their performance. Later,
in Sec. IV-D, we report on the performance on the n-ML
ensembles.
Training When training topologically manipulated DNNs,
we aimed to minimize the loss described in Eqn. 1. To this
end, we modified the training procedures that we use to train
the standard DNNs in three ways:
1) We extended each batch of benign inputs with the same
number of adversarial samples (x˜, ct) ∈ D˜ and specified
that x˜ should be classified as d[ct].
2) In certain cases, we slightly increased the number of
training epochs to improve the performance of the DNNs.
3) We avoided data augmentation for GTSRB, as we found
that it harmed the accuracy of (topologically manipulated)
DNNs on benign inputs.
To set λ (the parameter that balances the DNN’s benign ac-
curacy and the success of topology manipulation, see Eqn. 1),
we performed a hyperparameter search. We experimented with
values in {0.1, 0.5, 1, 2, 10} to find the best trade-off between
the n-ML ensembles’ benign accuracy and their ability to
mitigate attacks. We found that λ = 2 achieved the highest
accuracies at low attack success rates.
To train the best-performing n-ML ensemble, one should
select the best performing DNN architectures to train topo-
logically manipulated DNNs. However, since the goal of this
paper is to evaluate a defense, we aimed to give the attacker
the advantage to assess the resilience of the defense in a
worst-case scenario (e.g., so that the attacker could use the
better held-out DNNs as surrogates in transferability-based
attacks). Therefore, we selected the DNN architectures with
the lower benign accuracy to train topologically manipulated
DNNs. More specifically, for each dataset, we trained n-ML
ensembles by selecting round robin from the architectures
shown in rows 4–6 from Table I.
Constructing a dataset of adversarial examples, D˜, is a
key part of training topologically manipulated DNNs. As we
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aimed to defend against attacks with bounded L∞-norms,
we used the corresponding PGD attack to produce adver-
sarial examples: For each training sample x of class cx, we
produced m − 1 adversarial examples, one targeting every
class ct 6= cx. Moreover, we produced adversarial examples
with perturbations of different magnitudes to construct n-ML
ensembles that can resist attacks with varied strengths. For
MNIST, where attacks of magnitudes  ≤ 0.3 are typically
considered [47] we used  ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4}. For CIFAR10
and GTSRB, where attacks of magnitudes  ≤ 8255 are typi-
cally considered [47], [54], we used  ∈ { 2255 , 4255 , 6255 , 8255}.
(Thus, in total, |D˜| = 4 × (m − 1) × |D|.) We ran PGD
for 40 iterations, since prior work found that his leads to
successful attacks [47], [67]. Additionally, to avoid overfitting
to the standard DNNs that were used for training, we used
state-of-the-art techniques to enhance the transferability of the
adversarial examples, both by making the examples invariant
to spatial transformations [17], [82] and by producing them
against an ensemble of models [42], [76]—three standard
DNNs of architectures 4–6.
For each dataset, we trained a total of 18 topologically
manipulated DNNs. Depending on the setting, we used a
different subset of the DNNs to construct n-ML ensembles
(see Sec. IV-D). The DNNs were split into two sets of nine
DNNs each (< m for MNIST and CIFAR10), such that the
derangements of every pair of DNNs in the same set disagreed
on all indices.
Evaluation Each topologically manipulated DNN was
trained with two objectives in mind: classifying benign inputs
correctly (i.e., high benign accuracy) and classifying adversar-
ial examples as specified by the derangement drawn at training
time. Here we evaluate the extent to which the DNNs we
trained met these objectives. Note that these DNNs were not
meant to be used individually, but instead in the ensembles
evaluated in Sec. IV-D.
To measure the benign accuracy, we classified the original
(benign) samples from the test sets of datasets using the
18 topologically manipulated DNNs as well as the (better-
performing) standard DNNs that we held out from train-
ing topologically manipulated DNNs (i.e., architectures 1–
3). Table II reports the average and standard deviation of
the benign accuracy. Compared to the standard DNNs, the
topologically manipulated ones had only slightly lower ac-
curacy (0.64%–2.39% average decrease in accuracy). Hence,
we can conclude that topologically manipulated DNNs were
accurate.
Next, we measured the extent to which topology manipula-
tion was successful. To this end, we computed adversarial ex-
amples for the DNNs used to train topologically manipulated
DNNs (i.e., architectures 4–6) or DNNs held out from training
(i.e., architectures 1–3). Again, we used PGD and techniques
to enhance transferability to compute the adversarial examples.
As in prior work, we set  = 0.3 for MNIST and  = 8255 for
CIFAR10 and GTSRB, and we ran PGD for 40 iterations.
For each benign sample, x, we created m − 1 corresponding
adversarial examples, one targeting every class ct 6= cx. To
reduce the computational load, we used a random subset of
benign samples from the test sets: 1024 samples for MNIST
and 512 samples for the other datasets.
For constructing robust n-ML ensembles, the topologically
manipulated DNNs should classify adversarial examples as
specified during training, or, at least, differently than the
adversary anticipates. We estimated the former via the ma-
nipulation success rate (MSR)—the rate at which adversarial
examples were classified as specified by the derangements
drawn at training time—while we estimated the latter via the
targeting success rate (TSR)—the rate at which adversarial
examples succeeded at being misclassified as the target class.
A successfully trained topologically manipulated DNN should
obtain a high MSR and a low TSR.
Table II presents the average and standard deviation of TSRs
and MSRs for topologically manipulated DNNs, as well as
the TSRs for standard DNNs. One can immediately see that
targeting was much less likely to succeed for a topologically
manipulated DNN (average TSR≤6.82%) than for a standard
DNN (average TSR≥20.17%, and as high as 98.57%). In
fact, across all datasets and regardless of whether the adver-
sarial examples were computed against held-out DNNs, the
likelihood of targeting to succeed for standard DNNs was
×6.31 or higher than for topologically manipulated DNNs.
This confirms that the adversarial directions of topologically
manipulated DNNs were vastly different than those of standard
DNNs. Furthermore, as reflected in the MSR results, we found
that topologically manipulated DNNs were likely to classify
adversarial examples as specified by their corresponding de-
rangements. Across all datasets, and regardless of whether the
adversarial examples were computed against held-out DNNs or
not, the average likelihood of topologically manipulated DNNs
to classify adversarial examples according to specification
was ≥48.26%. For example, an average of 99.99% of the
adversarial examples produced against the held-out DNNs of
CIFAR10 were classified according to specification by the
topologically manipulated DNNs.
In summary, the results indicate that the topologically
manipulated DNNs satisfied their objectives to a large extent:
they accurately classified benign inputs, and their topology
with respect to adversarial directions was different than that of
standard DNNs, as they often classified adversarial examples
according to the specification that was selected at training time.
D. Evaluating n-ML Ensembles
Now we describe our evaluation of n-ML ensembles. We
begin by describing the experiment setup and reporting the
benign accuracy of ensembles of various sizes and thresholds.
We then present experiments to evaluate n-ML ensembles in
various settings and compare n-ML against other defenses. We
finish with an evaluation of the time overhead incurred when
deploying n-ML for inference.
1) Setup: The n-ML ensembles that we constructed were
composed of the topologically manipulated DNNs described
in the previous section. Particularly, we constructed ensembles
containing five (5-ML), nine (9-ML), or 18 (18-ML) DNNs, as
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Standard Topologically manipulated
Dataset Acc. TSR Acc. TSR TSR h/o MSR MSR h/o
MNIST 99.30%±0.09% 43.05%±7.97% 98.66%±0.42% <0.01% 6.82%±2.45% 99.98%±0.02% 53.23%±14.94%
CIFAR10 95.21%±0.13% 98.57%±0.66% 92.93%±0.39% <0.01% <0.01% 99.98%±0.02% 99.99%±0.01%
GTSRB 99.38%±0.19% 20.17%±1.48% 96.99%±1.45% 1.20%±0.27% 1.35%±0.27% 52.86%±9.05% 48.26%±4.68%
TABLE II: The performance of topologically manipulated DNNs compared to standard DNNs. For standard DNNs, we report
the average and standard deviation of the (benign) accuracy and the targeting success rate (TSR). TSR is defined as the rate at
which the DNN emitted the target class on a transferred adversarial example. For topologically manipulated DNNs, we report
the average and standard deviation of the accuracy, the TSR, and the manipulation success rate (MSR). MSR is the rate at which
adversarial examples were classified as specified by the derangements drawn at training time. TSR and MSR are reported for
adversarial examples produced against the same DNNs used during training or ones produced against held-out (h/o) DNNs.
we found ensembles of certain sizes to be more suitable than
others at balancing benign accuracy, security, and inference
time in different settings. For number of variants n ≤ 9, we
selected DNNs whose derangements disagreed in all indices
for the ensembles. For n = 18, we selected all the DNNs.
Note that since GTSRB contains a large number of classes
(m = 43), we could train 18 DNNs with derangements that
disagreed on all indices. However, we avoided doing so to save
compute cycles, as the DNNs that we trained performed well
despite having derangements that agreed on certain indices.
Other Defenses We compared n-ML with three state-of-
the-art defenses: AdvPGD [47], [67], LID [45], and NIC [44].
AdvPGD and LID use adversarial examples at training
time; we set the magnitude of the L∞-norm perturbations to
 = 0.3 to produce adversarial examples for MNIST, and to
 = 8255 for CIFAR10 and GTSRB, as these are typical attack
magnitudes that defenses attempt to prevent (e.g., [47], [54]).
For AdvPGD , we implemented and used the free adversarial
training method of Shafahi et al. [67], which adversarially
trains DNNs in the same amount of time as standard training.
We used AdvPGD to train four defended DNNs for each
dataset—one to be used by the defender, and three to be
used for transferring attacks in the grey-box setting (see
below). To give the defense an advantage, we used the best
performing architecture for the defender’s DNN (architecture
1 from Table I), and the least performing architectures for
the attacker’s DNNs (architectures 4–6). For CIFAR10, as the
DNN that we obtained after training did not perform as well as
prior works’, we used the adversarially trained DNN released
by Madry et al. [47] as the defender’s DNN.
For training LID detectors, we used the implementation
that was published by the authors [45]. As described in
Sec. II, LID detectors compute LID statistics for intermediate
representations of inputs and feed the statistics to a logistic
regression classifier to detect adversarial examples. The lo-
gistic regression classifier is trained using LID statistics of
benign samples, adversarial examples, and noisy variants of
benign samples (created by adding non-adversarial Gaussian
noise). We tuned the amount of noise for best performance
(i.e., highest benign accuracy and detection rate of adversarial
examples). For CIFAR10 and GTSRB, we trained LID de-
tectors for DNNs of architecture 1. For MNIST, we trained a
LID detector for the DNN architecture that was used in the
original work—architecture 4.
Using code that we obtained directly from the authors, we
trained two NIC detectors per dataset—one to be used by
the defender (in all settings), and one by the attacker in the
grey-box setting. The defender’s detectors were trained for
DNNs of the same architectures as for LID . For the attacker,
we trained detectors for DNNs of architectures 1, 4, and 2,
for MNIST, CIFAR10, and GTSRB, respectively. We selected
the attackers’ DNN architectures arbitrarily, and expect that
other architectures would perform roughly the same. The oc-
SVMs that we trained for NIC have Radial Basis Functions
(RBF) as kernels, since these were found to perform best for
detection [44].
Attack Methodology We evaluated n-ML and other de-
fenses against untargeted attacks, as they are easier to attain
from the point of view of attackers, and more challenging to
defend against from the point of view of the defender. For
AdvPGD , LID , and NIC , we used typical PGD untargeted
attacks with various adaptations depending on the setting.
Typical untargeted attacks, however, are unlikely to evade n-
ML ensembles, as if the target is not specified by the attack
then each DNN in the ensemble may classify the resulting
adversarial example differently, thus detecting the presence of
an attack. To address this, we used a more powerful attack,
similarly to Carlini and Wagner [11]. The attack builds on
targeted PGD to generate adversarial examples targeting all
possible incorrect classes (i.e., m − 1 in total) and checks if
one of these adversarial examples is misclassified by a large
number of DNNs in the ensemble (≥ τ ), and so is not detected
as adversarial by the n-ML ensemble. Because targeting every
possible class increases the computational load of attacks,
we used random subsets of test sets to produce adversarial
examples against n-ML. In particular, we used 1,000 samples
for MNIST and 512 samples for CIFAR10 and GTSRB. The
magnitude of L∞-norm of perturbations that we considered
were  ≤ 0.3 for MNIST and  ≤ 8255 for CIFAR10 and
GTSRB, and we ran attacks for 40 iterations. Again, we used
techniques to attack ensembles and enhance the transferability
of attacks [17], [42], [76], [82].
When directly attacking a DNN defended by LID , we
simply produced adversarial examples that were misclassified
with high confidence against the DNN while ignoring the
8
defense. This approach is motivated by prior work, which
found that high confidence adversarial examples mislead LID
with high likelihood [4]. When attacking a DNN defended
by NIC , we created a new DNN by combining the logits
of the original DNN and those of the classifiers built on
top of every intermediate layer. We found that forcing the
original DNN and the intermediate classifiers to (mis)classify
adversarial examples in the same manner often led the oc-
SVMs to misclassify adversarial examples as benign.
Measures In the context of adversarial examples, a de-
fense’s success is measured in its ability to prevent adversarial
examples, while maintaining high benign accuracy (e.g., close
to that of a standard classifier). The benign accuracy is the
rate at which benign inputs are classified correctly and not
detected as adversarial. In contrast, the success rate of attacks
is indicative of the defense’s ability to prevent adversarial
examples (high success rate indicates a weak defense, and
vice versa). For untargeted attacks, the success rate can be
measured by the rate at which adversarial examples are not
detected and are classified to a class other than the true
class. Note that AdvPGD is a method for robust classification,
as opposed to detection, and so adversarially trained DNNs
always output an estimation of the most likely class (i.e.,
abstaining from classifying an input that is suspected to be
adversarial is not an option).
We tuned the defenses at inference time to compute different
tradeoffs on the above metrics. In the case of n-ML, we
computed the benign accuracy and attacks’ success rates for
threshold values dn+12 e ≤ τ ≤ n. For LID , we evaluated
the metrics for different thresholds ∈ [0, 1] on the logistic
regression’s probability estimates that inputs are adversarial.
NIC emits scores in arbitrary ranges—the higher the score the
more likely the input to be adversarial. We computed accuracy
and success rate tradeoffs of NIC for thresholds between the
minimum and maximum values emitted for benign samples
and adversarial examples combined. In all cases, both the
benign accuracy and attacks’ success rates decreased as we
increased the thresholds. AdvPGD results in a single model
that cannot be tuned at inference time. We report the single
operating point that it achieves.
2) Results: We now present the results of our evaluations,
in terms of benign accuracy; resistance to adversarial examples
in the black-, grey-, and white-box settings; and overhead to
classification performance.
Benign Accuracy We first report on the benign accuracy of
n-ML ensembles. In particular we were interested in finding
how different was the accuracy of ensembles from single
standard DNNs. Ideally, it is desirable to maintain accuracy
that is as close to that of standard training as possible.
Fig. 3 compares n-ML ensembles’ accuracy with standard
DNNs, as well as with hypothetical ensembles whose DNN
members have the average accuracy of topologically manip-
ulated DNNs and independent errors. For low thresholds, it
can be seen that the accuracy of n-ML was close to the
average accuracy of standard benign DNNs. As we increased
the thresholds, the accuracy decreased. Nonetheless, it did
not decrease as dramatically as for ensembles composed from
DNNs with independent error. For example, the accuracy of
an ensemble containing five independent DNNs each with an
accuracy of 92.93% (the average accuracy of topologically
manipulated DNNs on CIFAR10) is 69.31% when τ = 5 (i.e.,
we require all DNNs to agree). In comparison, 5-ML achieved
84.82% benign accuracy for the same threshold on CIFAR10.
We can conclude that n-ML ensembles were almost as
accurate as standard models for low thresholds, and that they
did not suffer from dramatic accuracy loss as thresholds were
increased.
Black-box Attacks In the black-box setting, as the attacker
is unaware of the use of defenses and has no access to
the classifiers, we used non-interactive transferability-based
attacks to transfer adversarial examples produced against stan-
dard surrogate models. For n-ML and AdvPGD , we used a
strong attack by transferring adversarial examples produced
against the standard DNNs held-out from training the defenses.
For LID and NIC we found that transferring adversarial
examples produced against the least accurate standard DNNs
(architecture 6) was sufficient to evade classification with high
success rates.
Fig. 4 summarizes the results for the attacks with the highest
magnitudes. For n-ML, we report the performance of 5-ML
and 9-ML, which we found to perform well in the black-
box setting (i.e., they achieved high accuracy while mitigating
attacks). It can be seen that n-ML outperformed other defenses
across all the datasets. For example, for CIFAR10, 9-ML
was able to achieve 94.50% benign accuracy at 0.00% attack
success rate. In contrast, the second best defense, AdvPGD ,
achieved 87.24% accuracy at 14.02% attack success rate.
While not shown for the sake of brevity, additional ex-
periments that we performed demonstrated that n-ML in the
black-box setting performed roughly the same as in Fig. 4
when 1) different perturbation magnitudes were used ( ∈
{0.05, 0.1, . . . , 0.4} for MNIST and  ∈ { 1255 , 2255 , . . . , 8255}
for CIFAR10 and GTSRB); 2) individual standard DNNs were
used as surrogates to produce adversarial examples; and 3) the
same DNNs used to train topologically manipulated DNNs
were used as surrogates.
Grey-box Attacks In the grey-box setting (where attackers
are assumed to be aware of the deployment of defenses, but
have no visibility to the parameters of the classifier and the de-
fense), we attempted to transfer adversarial examples produced
against surrogate defended classifiers. For n-ML, we evaluated
5-ML and 9-ML in the grey-box setting. As surrogates, we
used n-ML ensembles of the same sizes and architectures
to produce adversarial examples. The derangements used for
training the DNNs of the surrogate ensembles were picked
independently from the defender’s ensembles (i.e., the de-
rangements could agree with the defender’s derangements on
certain indices). For AdvPGD , we used three adversarially
trained DNNs different than the defender’s DNNs as surro-
gates. For NIC we used standard DNNs and corresponding
detectors (different than the defender’s, see above for training
details) as surrogates. For LID , we simply produced adver-
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sarial examples that were misclassified with high confidence
against undefended standard DNNs of architecture 2 (these
were more architecturally similar to the defenders’ DNNs than
the surrogates used in the black-box setting).
Fig. 5 presents the performance of the defenses against the
attacks with the highest magnitudes. Again, we found n-ML
to achieve favorable performance over other defenses. In the
case of GTSRB, for instance, 9-ML could achieve 98.30%
benign accuracy at 1.56% attack success rate. None of the
other defenses was able to achieve a similar accuracy while
preventing ≥98.44% of the attacks for GTSRB.
Additional experiments that we performed showed that n-
ML maintained roughly the same performance as we var-
ied the number of DNNs in the attacker’s surrogate en-
sembles (n ∈ {1, 5, 9}) and the attacks’ magnitudes ( ∈
{0.05, 0.1, . . . , 0.4} for MNIST and  ∈ { 1255 , 3255 , 5255 , 7255}
for CIFAR10 and GTSRB).
White-Box Attacks Now we turn our attention to the white-
box setting, where attackers are assumed to have complete
access to classifiers’ and defenses’ parameters. In this setting,
we leveraged the attacker’s knowledge of the classifiers’
and defenses’ parameters to directly optimize the adversarial
examples against them.
Fig. 6 shows the results. One can see that, depending on
the dataset, n-ML outperformed other defenses, or achieved
comparable performance to the leading defenses. For GT-
SRB, n-ML significantly outperformed other defenses: 18-
ML achieved a benign accuracy of 86.01%–93.19% at attack
success-rates ≤8.20%. No other defense achieved comparable
benign accuracy for such low attack success-rates. We hypoth-
esize that n-ML was particularly successful for GTSRB, since
the dataset contains a relatively large number of classes, and so
there was a large space from which derangements for topology
manipulation could be drawn. The choice of the leading
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defense for MNIST and CIFAR10 is less clear (some defenses
achieved slightly higher benign accuracy, while others were
slightly better at preventing attacks), and depends on the
need to balance benign accuracy and resilience to attacks
at deployment time. For example, 18-ML was slightly better
at preventing attacks against MNIST than AdvPGD (1.30%
vs. 3.70% attack success-rate), but AdvPGD achieved slightly
higher accuracy for the same 18-ML operating point (99.25%
vs. 95.22%).
L2-norm Attacks The previous experiments showed that
n-ML ensembles could resist L∞-based attacks in various set-
tings. We performed a preliminary exploration using MNIST
to assess whether n-ML could also prevent L2-based attacks.
Specifically, we trained 18 topologically manipulated DNNs to
construct n-ML ensembles. The training process was the same
as before, except that we projected adversarial perturbations
to the L2 balls around benign samples when performing PGD
to produce adversarial examples for D˜. We created adversarial
examples with  ∈ {0.5, 1, 2, 3}, as we aimed to prevent
success rate
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Fig. 7: Performance of MNIST n-ML ensembles against L2-
norm PGD attacks with  = 3.
adversarial examples with  ≤ 3, following prior work [47].
The resulting topologically manipulated DNNs were accurate
(an average accuracy of 98.39%±0.55%).
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Dataset
Standard /
AdvPGD 5-ML 9-ML 18-ML LID NIC
MNIST 0.15ms ×1.93 × 2.80 × 4.73 ×943.47 × 601.07
CIFAR10 3.72ms ×3.57 × 6.07 × 12.07 ×551.88 × 581.51
GTSRB 0.68ms ×5.35 × 8.26 × 16.41 ×852.04 ×1457.26
TABLE III: Defenses’ overhead at inference time. The second
column reports the average inference time in milliseconds
for batches containing 32 samples for a single (standard or
adversarially trained) DNN. The columns to its right report
the overhead of defenses with respect to using a single DNN
for inference.
sing the models that we trained, we constructed n-ML
ensembles of different sizes and evaluated attacks in black-
, grey-, and white-box settings. The evaluation was exactly
the same as before, except that we use L2-based PGD with
 = 3 to produce adversarial examples. Fig. ?? summarizes
the results for 9-ML in black- and grey-box settings, and
for 18-ML in a white-box setting. It can be seen that n-ML
was effective at preventing L2-norm attacks while maintaining
high benign accuracy. For example, 9-ML was able to achieve
98.56% accuracy at ∼0% success rates for black- and grey-
box attacks, and 18-ML was able to achieve 97.46% accuracy
at a success rate of 1.40% for white-box attacks.
Overhead Of course, as n-ML requires us to run several
DNNs for inference instead of only one, using n-ML comes
at the cost of increased inference time at deployment. Now we
show that the overhead is relatively small, especially compared
to LID and NIC .
To measure the inference time, we sampled 1024 test
samples from every dataset and classified them in batches of
32 using the defended classifiers. We used 32 because it is
common to use for inspecting the behavior of DNNs [23], but
the trends in the time estimates remained the same with other
batch sizes. We ran the measurements on a machine equipped
with 64GB of memory and 2.50GHz Intel Xeon CPU using a
single NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPU.
The results are shown in Table III. AdvPGD did not incur
time overhead at inference due to producing a single DNN
to be used for inference. Compared to using a single DNN,
inference time with n-ML increased with n. At the same time
the increase was often sublinear in n. For example, for 18-
ML, the inference time increased ×4.73 for MNIST, ×12.07
for CIFAR10, and ×16.41 for GTSRB. Moreover, the increase
was significantly less dramatic than for LID (×551.88–943.47
increase) and NIC (×581.51–1,457.26 increase). There, we
observed that the main bottlenecks were computing the LID
statistics for LID , and classification with oc-SVMs for NIC .
V. DISCUSSION
Our experiments demonstrated the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of n-ML against L∞ and L2 attacks in various settings
for three datasets. Still, there are some limitations and practical
considerations to take into account when deploying n-ML. We
discuss these below.
Limitations Our experiments evaluated n-ML against L2
and L∞ attacks, as is typical in the literature (e.g., [47], [67]).
However, in reality, attackers can use other perturbation types
to evade n-ML (e.g., adding patterns to street signs to evade
recognition [18]). Conceptually, it should be possible to train
n-ML to defend against such perturbation types. We defer the
evaluation to future work.
As opposed to using a single ML algorithm for inference
(e.g., one standard DNN), n-ML requires using n DNNs. As
a result, more compute resources and more time are needed to
make inferences with n-ML. This may make it challenging
to deploy n-ML in settings where compute resources are
scarce and close to real-time feedback is expected (e.g., face-
recognition on mobile phones). Nonetheless, it is important
to highlight that n-ML is remarkably faster at making infer-
ences than state-of-the-art methods for detecting adversarial
examples [44], [45], as our experiments showed.
Currently, perhaps the most notable weakness of n-ML is
that it is limited to scenarios where the number of classes, m,
is large. In cases where m is small, one cannot draw many
distinct derangements to train DNNs with different topologies
with which to construct n-ML ensembles. For example, when
there are two classes (m = 2), there is only one derangement
that one can use to train a topologically manipulated DNN
(remember that !2 = 1), and so it is not possible to construct
an ensemble containing n ≥ 2 DNNs with distinct topologies.
A possible solution is to find a new method that does not
require derangements to topologically manipulate DNNs. We
plan to pursue this direction in future work.
Practical considerations ML systems often take actions
based on inferences made by ML algorithms. For example, a
biometric system may give or deny access to users based on
the output of a face-recognition DNN; an autonomous vehicle
may change the driving direction, accelerate, stop, or slow
down based on the output of a DNN for pedestrian detection;
and an anti-virus program may delete or quarantine a file based
on the output of an ML algorithm for malware detection. This
raises the question of how should a system that uses n-ML
for inference react when n-ML flags an input as adversarial.
We have a couple of suggestions for courses of action that
are applicable to different settings. One possibility is to fall
back to a more expensive, but less error prone, classification
mechanism. For example, if an n-ML ensemble is used for face
recognition and it flags an input as adversarial, a security guard
may be called to identify the person, and possibly override the
output of the ensemble. This solution is viable when the time
and resources to use an expensive classification mechanism
are available. Another possibility is to resample the input, or
classify a transformed variant of the input, to increase the
confidence in the detection or to correct the classification
result. For example, if an n-ML ensemble that is used for face
recognition on a mobile phone detects an input as adversarial,
the user may be asked to reattempt identifying herself using
a new image. In this case, because the benign accuracy of n-
ML is high and the attack success rate is low, a benign user
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is likely to succeed at identifying, while an attacker is likely
to be detected.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents n-ML, a defense that is inspired by n-
version programming, to defend against adversarial examples.
n-ML uses ensembles of DNNs to classify inputs by a majority
vote (when a large number of DNNs agree) and to detect
adversarial examples (when the DNNs disagree). To ensure
that the ensembles have high accuracy on benign samples
while also defending against adversarial examples, we train
the DNNs using a novel technique (topology manipulation)
which allows one to specify how adversarial examples should
be classified by the DNN at inference time. Our experiments
using two perturbation types (ones with bounded L2- and L∞-
norms) and three datasets (MNIST, CIFAR10, and GTSRB)
in black-, grey-, and white-box settings showed that n-ML is
an effective and efficient defense. In particular, n-ML roughly
retains the benign accuracies of state-of-the-art DNNs, while
providing more resilience to attacks than the best defenses
known to date and making inferences faster than most.
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